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In a partial equilibrium setting without price uncertainty, the balanced-budget substitution of 
an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) tax can enhance welfare in imperfectly 
competitive markets and is without impact in a competitive world. This paper demonstrates 
that a substitution of this kind can also increase expected output and welfare in a competitive 
market characterised by uncertainty about the commodity price, if firms can respond to the 
revelation of demand conditions by altering output. 
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"We conclude .. that the choice between the two taxes (i.e. an ad valorem and a specific 
tax) is a matter of indifference under competition …" (Musgrave 1959, p. 305f) 
"In a world of perfect competition, and in which the nature of the product being sold is 
immutable,  the  balance  between  ad  valorem  and  specific  taxation  is  a matter  of  no 
significance. For the essence of perfect competition is that firms … take the price at 
which they can sell their product as given, … ." (Keen 1998, p. 4) 
 
1. Introduction 
The  relative  merits  of  an  ad  valorem  tax  and  a  specific  (i.e.  unit)  tax  on  output  are  a 
longstanding issue. As the above quotations indicate, in a perfectly competitive market the 
two taxes are regarded as equivalent. Cournot (1838) – at least implicitly – and Wicksell 
(1896) clarify that this equivalence does not hold in a monopoly. Suits and Musgrave (1953) 
show that tax revenues resulting from a unit tax are lower than from an ad valorem tax, 
assuming tax rates which induce a monopolist to produce the same output. Skeath and Trandel 
(1994a), furthermore, make clear that the ad valorem tax Pareto-dominates a specific tax of 
equal yield. The analyses have been extended to monopolistic competition (Cheung 1998; 
Schröder 2004), oligopolies (Delipalla and Keen 1992; Denicolò and Matteuzzi 2000), and to 
frameworks in which firms can become informal and will then not pay taxes (Delipalla 2009a, 
b). In general, an ad valorem tax welfare-dominates a specific tax of equal yield, welfare 
being the sum of consumer and producer surplus.
1 However, this ranking is reversed for a 
monopsonist (Hamilton 1999) and may not hold in general equilibrium settings (Grazzini 
2006; Blackorby and Murty 2007), in differentiated or multiproduct oligopolies (Anderson et 
al. 2001; Hamilton 2009; Wang and  Zhao 2009), in the presence of externalities (Pirttilä 
2002), or in two-sided markets (Kind et al. 2009). 
Virtually all contributions to the debate assume payoffs to be certain. Such simplification will 
generally not affect the evaluation of a tax reform if risk-neutral firms are unable to react to 
the realisation of, for example, uncertain demand conditions; that is, if there is – what we call 
– ex-post uncertainty. In this paper, we also assume risk neutrality but ex-ante uncertainty 
instead  of  ex-post  uncertainty,  implying  that  the  position  of  the  demand  curve  becomes 
known before output decisions are made. We investigate how a balanced-budget substitution 
of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax in a perfectly competitive world of ex-ante uncertainty 
about  demand  conditions  affects  expected  output  and  welfare.  Accordingly,  the  analysis 
                                                 
1 See also Bishop (1968). There is a closely related literature on the use of ad valorem and specific tariffs in trade 
policy in models of imperfect competition. See, for example, Helpman and Krugman (1989, Chap. 4), Skeath 
and Trandel (1994b), Jørgensen and Schröder (2005), Collie (2006), and Shea and Shea (2006).   2 
pertains to products, such as regular consumption goods, for which demand does not vary too 
frequently, relative to the duration of the production process. Furthermore, we assume that tax 
rates are set prior to the revelation of the state of demand. This is a particularly relevant 
setting since consumption tax rates and the tax structure are altered only sporadically (cf. 
OECD 2008).  
The basic analysis takes the number of firms as given. In this short-run perspective, firms 
make profits because they are assumed to produce under conditions of decreasing returns to 
scale. The substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax of equal expected yield can 
result in higher expected output and a Pareto-improvement from an ex-ante perspective. This 
finding contrasts with Musgrave's and Keen's assertions for a world of certainty in which 
firms are price-takers, as quoted above. The intuition for the superiority of the ad valorem tax 
is as follows: since the ad valorem tax constitutes a fraction of the demand price, substituting 
it for a specific tax lowers the after-tax price variability, holding constant the expected tax 
payment per unit of output. This reduction induces the firm to raise expected output since the 
cost  function  is  strictly  convex.  Nonetheless,  the  fall  in  the  variability  of  after-tax  prices 
lowers expected net profits because of the (strict) convexity of the profit function.  If the 
government is to hold constant expected tax revenues, the quantity expansion requires a fall in 
the expected tax burden per unit of output. As a consequence, expected net profits go up. If 
expected  output  and  profits  rise,  the  shift  towards  ad  valorem  taxation  can  be  a  Pareto-
improvement.  In  the  long  run,  entry  and  exit  of  firms  can  be  argued  to  ensure  constant 
expected net profits and it is shown that in this particular case the tax structure becomes 
irrelevant again.  
An income tax which allows for the deduction of losses can induce risk-averse agents to 
perform more of a taxable activity with uncertain outcomes than in the absence of taxation. 
The findings outlined above may, at first sight, therefore be based on this so-called Domar-
Musgrave  effect  (1944).  However,  our  analysis  presumes  risk  neutrality.  Moreover,  firms 
benefit from uncertainty because of their assumed ability to respond to price variations and 
the convexity of the profit function. Accordingly, it is not the role of the government as an 
implicit insurer against risk which induces the increase in output but the interaction of lower 
expected costs, the ensuing rise in production, and the fall in expected taxes per unit of output. 
A comparison between ad valorem and specific taxes in a perfectly competitive market of ex-
ante uncertainty has not yet been undertaken. Assuming ex-post uncertainty, Fraser (1985) 
obtains  ambiguous  results  for  strictly  risk-averse  firms,  whereas  risk-neutral  firms  are   3 
unaffected by a substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax, as mentioned above. 
Dickie and Trandel (1996) investigate a setting with ex-ante price uncertainty and a negative 
(production) externality. Dickie and Trandel compute the specific and ad valorem tax rates 
and the output quota which minimise the expected welfare loss due to the externality. In the 
absence of the externality – the case  considered here – optimal Pigouvian taxes are zero 
because the government does not face a revenue constraint. Accordingly, Dickie and Trandel 
(1996) do not investigate the relative welfare effects of equal yield ad valorem and specific 
taxes. In a further contribution related to our investigation, Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2010) 
show that the relative superiority of ad valorem taxes in a Cournot oligopoly may no longer 
hold if marginal costs are uncertain. Finally, analyses of settings with endogenous quality 
choices are relevant to our study. This is the case because the equivalence of ad valorem and 
specific taxes in competitive markets vanishes (Liu 2003; Delipalla and Keen 2006) since the 
two types of taxes affect the firms' incentives to alter quality and output levels differently.  
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  In  Section  2,  the  model  is  set  up, 
assuming a given number of firms. Section 3 investigates the output effects of raising the ad 
valorem tax rate and lowering the specific tax, holding constant expected tax revenues. For 
expositional reasons and to convey the intuition for the result as succinctly as possible, a 
horizontal inverse demand curve is assumed. Subsequently, in Section 4, a downward-sloping 
demand curve is derived explicitly from the household's optimisation behaviour. It is shown 
that under mild additional conditions the findings obtained for the horizontal inverse demand 
curve continue to hold. Furthermore, Section 4 elaborates on the long run in which the entry 
and exit of firms ties down the level of profits. Section 5 analyses welfare effects, while 
Section 6 summarises the findings. Some calculations are relegated to an Appendix. 
 
2. A Simple Model 
The  analysis  takes  a  partial  equilibrium  perspective  and  focuses  on  one  market.  A  given 
number of risk-neutral, identical firms produce a homogeneous commodity. With probability 
zH, 0 < zH < 1, the pre-tax output price pi is high, pi = pH, whereas with probability zL the 
output price is low, pi = pL, where zL + zH = 1 and 0 < pL < pH, i = L, H. Firms are price 
takers and use production technology exhibiting decreasing returns to scale. Accordingly, the 
cost function C(xi) is strictly convex and marginal costs C'(xi) are positive and increasing 
with the quantity xi produced by the (representative) firm in state i, 0 = C(0) < C'(xi), C''(xi).   4 
The inverse demand curve is horizontal (initially). Firms learn about the price before deciding 
about output (ex-ante uncertainty). They have to pay a specific tax at rate τ, 0 ≤ τ, and an ad 
valorem tax t, 0 ≤ t < 1, defined as a fraction of the demand price pi. We assume that tax rates 
are set prior to the revelation of the price and are determined in such a manner that the after-
tax price will always be positive (pi(1 – t) – τ > 0). A representative firm's net profits in state i 
can, hence, be expressed as: 
) i x ( C i x ) ) t 1 ( i p ( ) i x ( - t - - = p           (1) 
The firm maximises expected net profits Π(xH, xL) = zHπ(xH) + zLπ(xL). Since the firm 
knows about the state of the world when making its decision, it chooses output in each state 
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For simplicity, the number of firms is normalised to unity. In the presence of a horizontal 
inverse demand curve, equation (2) then also describes the change in the equilibrium quantity 
owing to a variation in tax rates.  
The government incurs a fixed expenditure and – as mentioned above – has to set tax rates 
prior to the revelation of the state of demand. This implies that actual tax revenues are likely 
to vary with the price, for a given tax structure, because output levels adjust. Accordingly, the 
question arises what the appropriate definition of a balanced budget is, which then determines 
the extent to which one tax rate can be substituted for another. One possibility would be a 
restriction of constant revenues, irrespective of the state of the world. Keen (1998), however, 
shows that this requirement uniquely determines the tax structure as a function of the price 
elasticity of demand. A further option would be constant revenues for any tax structure in a 
given state of demand. A third possibility would be constant expected tax revenues. This is 
the  definition  of  a  balanced  budget  employed  in  the  earlier  contributions  on  the  optimal 
commodity structure under uncertainty by Fraser (1985) and Kotsogiannis and Serfes (2010), 
and it will also be applied here.  
For a given expenditure, the government will incur a budget deficit (surplus) if tax revenues 
are low (high), However, if the government could borrow and lend at the same interest rate, 
constant  expected  tax  revenues  would  ensure  a  balanced  budget  in  the  long-run.  An 
alternative justification for using the concept of constant expected revenues as restriction for   5 
tax policy could be the assumption that there are many markets, such as the one considered 
here, and that shocks are idiosyncratic. In consequence, zi can be viewed as the probability 
that a particular market is in state i, and aggregate tax revenues will, hence, be constant if the 
number of markets is sufficiently large. Furthermore, the requirement of constant expected tax 
revenues can be the appropriate one if the government cannot insure against variations in tax 
revenues, either indirectly or directly, but the share of risk born by each individual tax payer 
is sufficiently small (cf. Arrow and Lind 1970). Assuming, therefore, that any tax reform must 
leave expected tax revenues unaffected, implies dB = 0, where B is given by: 
) L tp ( L x L z ) H tp ( H x H z L B H B B t + + t + = + =        (3) 
Note, finally, that if the sequence of decisions were different and the government decided on 
tax rates after the state of the world had been revealed, the tax structure would not affect 
output. Put differently, as long as the government cannot perfectly condition tax rates on the 
output price, the subsequent findings continue to hold.  
 
3. Output Effects of Commodity Tax Reform: Simple Model 
Assume that the government marginally lowers the specific tax τ and raises the ad valorem 
tax rate t, holding constant expected tax revenues B. To calculate the feasible decline in the 
specific tax rate τ, we totally differentiate equation (3): 
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: i B , for i = L, H.   (5) 
We assume a positive budgetary effect of a rise in either tax rate. Clearly,  i Bt,  i
t B  > 0,  
Bt, Bτ > 0, and B = 0 will hold if tax rates are zero. Therefore, starting from a tax rate level of 
zero, a rise in t or τ will ensure an increase in expected revenues. A further rise in tax rates 
will have a less pronounced positive budgetary effect because the tax base, ceteris paribus, 
shrinks with the decline in output. While, therefore, theoretically further increases in tax rates 
may  eventually  reduce  tax  revenues  in  the  spirit  of  a  Laffer-curve-type  relationship,  a 
government facing  a budget  constraint will never choose tax rates in such a manner that    6 
Bt < 0 or Bτ < 0 hold.  If the government had (accidentally) done so, it could lower the 
respective  tax  rate,  thereby  increasing  expected  revenues,  and  also  raising  output  in  both 
states  of  the  world  because  ∂xi/∂τ,  ∂xi/∂t  <  0  (cf.  equation  (2)).  As  a  consequence,  the 
question of whether the government should substitute one tax rate for the other to increase 
output and welfare will only make sense if Bt, Bτ > 0 holds.
2  
The change in expected output X, X := zHxH + zLxL, owing to the (marginal) substitution of 
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Replacing the quantity adjustments and the required tax rate variation in accordance with 











t + t =
=
H p
L B H B
L p L B H p H B














t + t + L p
L B H B
L p L B H p H B
) L x ( ' ' C
L z
   
            

 
 - - -
t
-
= ) L p H p ( t L x ) L x ( ' ' C H x ) H x ( ' ' C
) H x ( ' ' C ) L x ( ' ' C B
L z H z ) L p H p (
    (7) 
The  first  term  in  equation  (7)  is  positive  since  pH  >  pL,  Bτ  >  0,  and  C''(xi)  >  0.  The 
expression in square brackets will unambiguously be positive if marginal costs C'(xi) are not 
too concave and the ad valorem tax rate t, weighted by the price difference pH – pL > 0, is not 
too high initially. In general, the term in square brackets will be non-zero, irrespective of the 
extent of uncertainty, that is, the difference between pH and pL. Therefore, we obtain: 
Proposition 1: 
Assume a given number of risk-neutral, profitable firms, (some) ex-ante uncertainty 
about the demand price, a perfectly competitive output market, and a positive initial 
specific tax rate τ.  
a) The substitution of an ad valorem tax t for a specific tax τ, holding constant expected 
tax revenues, alters expected output.   
                                                 
2 Other contributions have approached this issue, following the approach pioneered by Suits and Musgrave 
(1953), by looking at what Delipalla and Keen (1992) call a P-shift, namely a substitution of one tax for the 
other, holding constant tax revenues per unit at a given price; that is, ignoring the budgetary repercussions of 
quantity and price adjustments.   7 
b) If marginal costs are (weakly) convex, the introduction of an ad valorem tax t and a 
reduction of the specific tax τ such that expected tax revenues remain constant will raise 
expected output. 
Assume, initially, linearly increasing marginal costs (C''(xH) = C''(xL) > 0 = C'''(xi)). One 
rationalisation for part b) of Proposition 1 focuses on a setting in which the tax reform does 
not affect the expected output level X. Another feasible explanation takes constant expected 
tax payments per unit of output as its starting point. A tax reform not affecting expected 
output X will raise expected tax revenues since the increase in revenues from the ad valorem 
tax more than compensates for the loss resulting from the fall in the specific tax (as shown in 
Appendix 7.1). This is the case because the rise in tax receipts from the ad valorem tax t in the 
high-price state is greater than in the low-price state, not only because of the output difference 
but also because of the price differential. The fall in tax receipts owing to the decline in the 
specific tax rate τ, however, is unaffected by the price differential. If the firm produces the 
same expected output while tax revenues  go up, a balanced-budget tax reform  requires  a 
reduction in at least one tax rate, inducing an increase in output.  
Turning  to  the  second  explanation,  assume  that  the  specific  tax  is  lowered  while  the  ad 
valorem  tax  is  raised  to  such  an  extent  that  expected  tax  payments  per  unit  of  output  
(zHpH + zLpL)t + τ are constant. The fall in the specific tax τ raises the after-tax price in both 
states of the world by the same amount. The ad valorem tax t, however, lowers the after-tax 
price  in  the  high-price  state  by  a  larger  absolute  amount  than  in  the  low-price  state. 
Accordingly, the firm reduces output in the high-price state and increases it in the low-price 
state. Given a strictly convex cost function, expected output rises. As the profit function, too, 
is  strictly  convex,  the  reduced  difference  in  after-tax  prices  lowers  expected  net  profits. 
However, the increase in output causes a budget surplus and the tax payment per unit can be 
reduced. This induces the firm to expand expected output further and guarantees an increase 
in expected net profits.
3 This reasoning will apply without limitations if the product of the 
initial tax rate t and the price difference (pH – pL) is not too large. The greater the price 
difference, the larger the fall in expected output resulting from a given increase in the ad 
valorem tax rate. The higher the initial ad valorem tax rate, the more pronounced the decline 
in tax revenues will be due to a given reduction in expected output. An initial ad valorem tax 
rate of zero rules out such a tax base effect.  
                                                 
3 See equation (11) below. Clearly, the increase in (expected) output will also arise in the present setting if the 
output market is not competitive but characterised, for example, by a monopoly. This will be the case since the 
uncertainty and market power effect reinforce each other.   8 
In Figure 1, quadratic costs (C''(xH) = C''(xL) > 0 = C'''(xi)), a horizontal inverse demand 
curve, and zH = zL = 0.5 are presumed. In the absence of taxes, output will be xH (xL) if the 
price is high (low) and equals pH (pL). A specific tax causes a downward shift of both inverse 
demand curves by an (identical) amount τ, resulting in after-tax prices  H pt  and  L pt , where 
H pt / L pt  > pH/pL. The output level in both states of the world falls by the same amount to 
H xt  and  L xt , implying xH -  H xt  = xL -  L xt  > 0. The ad valorem tax t shifts the inverse 
demand curves downward by the same fraction of the initial price ( H
t p / L
t p  = pH/pL). The 
new equilibrium quantities are  H
t x  and  L
t x , where xH -  H
t x  > xL -  L
t x  > 0. Since the tax 
reform reduces output by less in the high-price state than it raises output in the low-price state 
((xH -  H
t x ) - (xH -  H xt ) =  H xt  -  H
t x  <  L
t x  -  L xt ), expected output increases. In addition, 
the ad valorem tax yields higher expected tax revenues than the specific tax.
4 
Figure 1: An Illustration 
 
If  marginal  costs  are  strictly  convex  (C''(xH)  >  C''(xL)  >  0  <  C'''(xi)),  at  least  in  the 
neighbourhood of the initial output levels, the positive output effect of the balanced-budget 
tax reform will be strengthened. As pointed out above, a high initial ad valorem tax rate t and 
                                                 
4 As an example, suppose pH = 16 = 2pL, C'(x) = 2 + 0.5x, zH = zL = 0.5, τ = 2 and t = 0.15625. We then have 
xH = 28, xL = 12,  H xt  = 24 = 3 L xt , X(τ = 2) = 16, B(τ = 2) = 32,  H
t p  = 13.5 = 2 L
t p ,  H
t x  = 23,  L
t x  = 9.5,  
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x  9 
a high price difference pH - pL make it less likely that positive output effects occur. However, 
it is unlikely that both effects exactly cancel out. As long as there is some uncertainty of the 
ex-ante type, the tax reform alters expected output, as Part a) of Proposition 1 indicates. 
 
4. Output Effects of Commodity Tax Reform: Partial Equilibrium Setting 
The analysis has thus far been based on the simplifying assumption of a horizontal inverse 
demand curve to provide a clear intuition for the non-equivalence of equal expected yield ad 
valorem and specific taxes in a competitive output market with ex-ante price uncertainty. In 
this section we show that the same finding can be obtained in a setting in which demand is 
explicitly derived from the households' optimisation decisions, while price variations result 
from shocks to preferences.
5 Accordingly, the demand function is downward sloping and the 
prices  pH  and  pL  are  no  longer  exogenous  but  determined  endogenously  as  equilibrium 
outcomes. 
Suppose, therefore, that the representative household's utility function is quasi-linear. Overall 
utility is increasing and strictly concave in the utility αiu(xi) from consuming the good under 
consideration, αiu'(xi) > 0 > αiu''(xi), and linear in a second commodity, the price of which is 
normalised to unity. The parameter αi, i = L, H, αH > αL > 0, captures shocks to preferences 
which  induce  ex-ante  uncertainty  about  the  position  of  the  demand  curve.  Given  an 
exogenous income and assuming an interior solution, the demand for the good is implicitly 
determined by αiu'(xi) - pi = 0. Therefore, the inverse demand function is downward sloping, 
its slope being given by ∂pi(xi)/∂xi = αiu''(xi) < 0. Furthermore, the inverse demand function 
pH(xH) is located above pL(xL) for any given quantity. Normalising the number of price-
taking  households  and  firms  to  unity  and  incorporating  the  firm's  first-order  condition  
pi(1 - t) - τ = C'(xi), the market equilibrium can be defined by C'(xi) + τ - (1 - t)αiu'(xi) = 0. 
For   (xi)  :=  C''(xi)  -  (1  -  t)αiu''(xi)  >  0,  the  impact  of  a  shock  to  preferences  on  the 
equilibrium quantity xi is found to be positive: 
0
) i x (









            (8) 
Accordingly, the equilibrium price pi also rises with the parameter αi: 
                                                 
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee  for suggesting this explicit derivation of the downward-sloping 
demand curve in the context of a proper and self-contained partial equilibrium model.   10 
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Equations (8) and (9) clarify that the inequalities xH > xL and pH > pL also hold in a proper 
partial equilibrium setting, implying that the simplifications underlying the model of Section 2 
are consistent with a more elaborate analytical specification.  
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The decline in the specific tax rate τ, required to balance the budgetary impact resulting from 
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      (5') 
In equation (5'), dpi/dxi describes the change in the equilibrium price pi in state i due to a tax-
induced variation in the (equilibrium) output level xi. To distinguish the effects arising in the 
partial equilibrium setting characterised by the downward-sloping demand curve from those 
occurring in a world with a horizontal inverse demand curve (cf. Section 3), we use a tilda (~) 
for the relevant variables.  i B
~
t and  i Bt, for example, differ because, first, the output changes 
(∂xi/∂τ) of a given tax rate variation are not the same and, second, the tax rate change will 
induce price effects only if the demand curve is downward sloping, as the comparison of 
equations (5) and (5') clarifies. 
Once again, we assume that  t B
~
 and  t B
~
 are positive. If this were not the case, the government 
could  lower  the  respective  tax  rate  to  increase  expected  revenues.  Since,  moreover, 
equilibrium output levels decline with the tax rates (cf. equation (2')), substituting one tax rate 
for another will only represent a viable tax policy option if lowering a tax rate is costly to the   11 
government. Following the same procedure as in the derivation of dX/dt, i.e. substituting  t B
~
 
for Bτ and  (xi) for C''(xi) in (7), the variation in expected aggregate output  X
~
 due to the 
introduction of an ad valorem tax (so that the initial ad valorem tax rate t is zero, t = tI = 0) 
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    (10) 
If  the  marginal  cost  curve  is  (weakly)  convex  (C''(xH)  ≥  C''(xL)  >  0),  while  the  inverse 
demand curve pi(xi) is (weakly) concave (u'''(xi) ≤ 0),  (xH) ≥  (xL) > 0 will apply. Under 
this restriction, expected output will continue to rise with the balanced-budget introduction of 
an ad valorem tax for a specific tax because xH > xL holds (cf. equation (8)). In consequence, 
the result summarised in Proposition 1 continues to apply. The rationale for this is as follows: 
If the inverse demand curve is downward sloping and strictly concave, the reduction in the 
output differential in the two states will raise the average price received. Therefore, the effects 
of a given tax rate change on output are strengthened. In terms of Figure 1, a downward shift 
of a negatively-sloped inverse demand curve reduces the equilibrium quantity in the high-
price state – characterised by a greater absolute slope of pH(xH) – by less than in the low-
price state. As a result, the fall in the quantity  H xt  -  H
t x  becomes less in relative terms and 
the positive expected output effect of the tax reform is enhanced. 
The assumption of a strictly convex cost function is certainly plausible in the short run. In the 
long run, however, entry and exit of firms is likely to take place so that firms are producing at 
minimum expected average costs. The question then arises as to whether the non-neutrality of 
the proposed tax reform also applies in a competitive (very) long-run setting. To answer this 
question, we continue to assume a downward-sloping inverse demand curve and the following 
sequence of decisions: initially, the government sets the tax rates; subsequently, firms enter 
the market and, given the entry decision, the output price will be revealed; finally, firms select 
output.  In  such  a  setting,  expected  output  will  be  unaffected  by  the  balanced-budget 
introduction of an ad valorem tax for a specific tax if entry (and exit) of firms allows for no 
variation in expected profits (see Appendix 7.2 for the proof). The intuition is as follows: If 
expected net profits and tax revenues are to be unaffected by the tax reform, expected gross 
profits must remain constant. This will only be feasible if output in both states of the world is 
left unchanged by the tax reform. Effectively, the assumption of constant expected net profits   12 
rules out the possibility that tax reforms alter expected costs and, therefore, induce firms to 
change the expected output level. 
 
5. Welfare Effects of Commodity Tax Reform 
To analyse the welfare consequences of the substitution of an ad valorem tax for a specific 
tax, suppose that expected output rises, implying that entry and exit of firms is not feasible at 
a sufficient rate to rule out a change in expected profits. Initially, a horizontal inverse demand 
curve is considered. Since quantities are chosen optimally, following the same procedure as in 
the calculation of the output effect, will yield the subsequent expression for the variation in 
expected net profits Π if marginal costs are assumed to be linear and increasing (C''(xL) = 
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If the ad valorem tax is introduced, that is, if expression (11) is evaluated at an initial tax rate  
t = tI = 0, expected net profits will unambiguously rise. Assuming identical households, their 
utility can be argued not to change with an output expansion if the inverse demand curve is 
horizontal. Since the budget is balanced in expected terms, the tax reform represents a Pareto-
improvement from an ex-ante perspective. 
However, the picture becomes more opaque in the presence of a downward-sloping inverse 
demand  curve  as  derived  in  Section  4.  Since  expected  aggregate  output  X
~
  increases  by 
assumption,  while xL  rises  and  xH  declines  due  to  the  tax  reform,  -zL/zH  <  ∂xH/∂xL  =  





 := zHαHu(xH) + zLαLu(xL) + y – zLpLxL – zHpHxH, is, using αiu'(xi) = pi, found to be: 
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Based  on  the  convention  used  in  equation  (5'),  dpi/dxi  in  equation  (12)  captures  the 
adjustment in the price pi resulting from a reduction in the equilibrium quantity xi due to a 
rise  in  a  tax  rate.  Furthermore,  we  can  write  the  variation  in  expected  net  profits  
P ~  = zHp ~ (xH) + zLp ~ (xL), where  p ~ (xi) = ((1 - t)pi(xi) + τ)xi – C(xi), as the sum of the 
variation  in  profits  Π  resulting  in  the  setting  with  a  horizontal  inverse  demand  curve,  
Π = zHp(xH) + zLp(xL),  and an additional term which turns out to be a fraction of the 
variation in expected consumer surplus S
~
. To do so, we use, first, the definition of dXL/dt, as 
employed  in  equation  (12)  and,  second,  ∂xH/∂t  =  (∂xH/∂xL)(∂xL/∂t),  where  ∂xH/∂xL  =  
-zL/zH + ε < 0 for ε > 0, as defined above. 
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To determine the sign of dP ~ /dt, it is helpful to note that if the initial ad valorem tax rate t is 
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      (14) 
A sufficient condition for the term in square brackets in equation (14) to be positive, given  
pH > pL,  t B
~
 > 0, and xH > xL, is  (xH) ≥  (xL). This (weak) inequality will hold, as   14 
outlined above, if the marginal costs curve is linear (implying C'''(xi) = 0) and marginal utility 
is weakly concave (such that u''(xi) < 0 ≥ u'''(xi)). Putting equations (13) and (14) together, 
observe, finally, that dP ~ /dt + dS
~
/dt = dΠ/dt > 0 for an initial ad valorem tax rate t of zero  
(t = tI = 0) and dB
~
 = 0. Therefore, the welfare impact of the balanced-budget tax reform can 
be summarised as follows: 
Proposition 2 
Assume a  given number of  risk-neutral firms, linear marginal  costs, (some) ex-ante 
uncertainty  about  the  demand  price,  a  perfectly  competitive  output  market,  and  the 
balanced-budget introduction of an ad valorem tax t for a specific tax τ which is positive 
initially.   
a)  If  the  inverse  demand  curve  is  horizontal,  the  tax  reform  will  be  a  Pareto-
improvement. 
b) In the partial equilibrium setting with an inverse demand curve explicitly derived 
from  the  households'  optimisation  behaviour,  the  sum  of  expected  consumer  and 




This paper has shown that the substitution of an ad valorem tax on output for a specific (unit) 
tax of the same expected yield will raise expected output in a perfectly competitive market in 
the presence of some ex-ante uncertainty if firms are risk-neutral and can respond to price 
variations  by  output  adjustments,  marginal  production  costs  are  increasing  and  weakly 
convex, the inverse demand curve is weakly concave and the initial ad valorem tax rate is 
sufficiently  low.  This  increase  in  expected  output  implies  higher  welfare  and  may  also 
represent a Pareto-improvement from an ex-ante view. Accordingly, an ad valorem tax can 
not only be superior to a specific tax of equal yield in imperfectly competitive markets but 
will be so – based on plausible assumptions – in a competitive setting. This effect is due to the 
strict convexity of the cost function, ensuring that the fall in after-tax price variability raises 
(expected) output. The positive output effect of a shift towards ad valorem taxation will no 
longer  occur  if  aggregate  output  is  determined  by  a  zero  expected  profit  condition  or  if 
marginal production costs are constant. However, a model with constant expected profits can 
be viewed as a limiting case of a set-up relevant for policy advice, because such a long-run   15 
equilibrium will – in the spirit of Keynes' (1923, p. 65) famous obiter dictum that "… this 
long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead" – never 
actually be attained. Given this interpretation and following Keen's (1998, p. 4) assertion 
quoted at the beginning that " the essence of perfect competition is that firms … take the price 
at which they can sell their product as given", the findings summarised in Propositions 1 and 
2 constitute valuable policy information because they suggest that even in the absence of 
market imperfections an ad valorem tax may be preferable to a specific tax.   16 
7. Appendix 
7.1 Change in Expected Revenues in Simple Model 
The change in expected output X = zHxH + zLxL owing to a rise in the ad valorem tax rate t 
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=     (A.1) 
Assuming linear marginal costs (C''(xH) = C''(xL) > 0), the required decline in τ for dX/dt = 0 
to hold equals dτ/dt = - (zHpH + zLpL) < 0, since zH + zL = 1. Using the fact that pi i Bt =  i
t B  
from equation (5), the change in expected revenues B, due to a marginal rise in t and a fall in 
τ, so that expected output X is unaffected, is given by: 
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In the derivation of (A.2) we have made use of equations (2) and (5). Evaluating the last line 
of (A.2) at an initial tax rate t of t = tI = 0 clarifies that the budget experiences a surplus. 
 
7.2 Long-run Model 
With the exception of the modifications mentioned in the main text (cf. the last paragraph of 
Section 4), the analysis is based on the framework outlined in Section 2. In addition, we 
assume the inverse demand function to be downward sloping, as derived in Section 4. To 
simplify the exposition, we normalise the number of firms to unity and do not explicitly 
model the entry decision. Given that entry takes place until the net expected output price 
equals the minimum of expected average costs, the effects of entry and exit can be captured 
by calculating the variation in the expected output level of the representative firm, which   17 
takes  the  output  price  as  given.  Expected  net  profits  equal  P ~ (xH,  xL)  =  zHp ~ (xH)  + 
zLp ~ (xL).  The  change in  output xi owing to a marginal rise in the specific tax τ can be 
calculated by differentiating expected net profits P ~ (xH, xL) with respect to xi and τ.  
t + - + = P d ) L x L z H x H z ( L dx L x
L dx
L dp L z H dx H x
H dx
H dp H z ~ d     (A.3) 
Setting dP ~  = 0 because expected profits  P ~ (xH, xL) are constant due to entry and exit, and 
solving for the change in output in state i due to a rise of the specific tax rate τ yields: 
i dx
i dp i x i z
L x L z H x H z




           (A.4) 
In equation (A.4), dpi(xi)/dxi < 0 depicts the change in the equilibrium price owing to an 
increase in output in state i, i = L, H (see equation (5') as well). To simplify the subsequent 
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Substituting these definitions into (A.4), we obtain: 
0 iL x iH x
i dx
i dp i x i z
L x L z
i dx
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H x H z
0 ~ d d
i dx
< t + t = + =
= P t
     (A.6) 
The change in xi due to an increase in the ad valorem tax rate t can be calculated in an 
analogous manner, using the variables defined in equations (A.5), and is given by: 
0 iL x L p iH x H p
0 ~ d dt
i dx
< t + t =
= P
          (A.7) 
The effects of a rise in the tax rates τ and t on the budget, again evaluating the respective 
terms at an initial tax rate t = tI = 0, are – making use of equations (4'), (5'), (A.6) and (A.7) – 
given by  t B ˆ  and  t B ˆ , where the (^) indicates that the respective derivatives are calculated for 
the restriction dP ~  = 0:   18 
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t - t - t - t + t =       (A.8b) 
Following the argument made in the main text, we assume the derivatives  t B ˆ  and  t B ˆ  to be 
positive.  The  change  in  expected  output  X ˆ   is  determined  by  a  modified  equation  (6). 
Substituting in accordance with (A.6) and (A.7) and taking into account dτ/dt = - t B ˆ / t B ˆ  from 
equations (A.8) together with the assumption that the initial ad valorem tax rate t is zero  
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Extracting  t B ˆ  in the denominator of (A.9) and substituting  L B ˆ H B ˆ
t + t  for  t B ˆ  and pH H B ˆ
t  + 
pL L B ˆ
t  - T for  t B ˆ  in the numerator (cf. equations (A.8)) gives: 
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    (A.10) 
Substituting  for  i B ˆ
t,  i  =  L,  H,  (cf.  (A.8a)),  noting  that  zLxL HH xt   =  zHxH HL xt   and 
zLxL LH xt   =  zHxH LL xt   (from  the  definitions  in  (A.5)),  and  collecting  terms,  we  obtain 
dX ˆ /dt = 0. 
   20 
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